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Sandrine Berges SB: - “ In Republicanism (Oxford University Press, 1997) you develop the 
concept of freedom as non-domination and explain its centrality in Republican theory. 
You mention Rousseau throughout the book. How closely related are your conceptions 
of Republicanism and freedom as non-domination to Rousseau’s thought?” 
 
Philip Pettit PP: - “I think that Rousseau stands at the intersection of two traditions of 
thought, though as a thinker of the first rank he transforms each into something 
original and distinctively his own. The first tradition is the neo-Roman tradition that I 
try to describe, in which the main emphasis is on the connection between being free 
and not being dependent on the goodwill of other individuals or groupings: not being 
subjected to others as to a master who can interfere arbitrarily in one’s life. The other 
tradition that is important to Rousseau is medieval in origin, rather than Roman. It 
represents the people in a polity as a ‘corporatio’, in the language of medieval law: an 
entity that can act as a single person, having distinctive rights and obligations, even 
distinctive views and purposes. Rousseau’s image of ‘le people souverain’ derives 
directly from that tradition, I believe, and is quite independent of his commitment to 
republican principles. His work consists in taking the two traditions forward and 
melding them into a novel, organic whole.  
 
My own approach builds on the republican approach, and not at all on the corporatist 
one. Hence there are real points of contrast between the sort of republican synthesis 
that I try to describe and Rousseau’s image of things. I think that republicans should 
worry about the relation of individuals to the public power of the people and state, as 
well as to the private power that other individuals and groups may have over them. In 
particular, I think that they should worry about this in a more intense way than 
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Rousseau might suggest. I am less optimistic about the rule of the people-en-masse, 
even a people that is committed, as he wants, to a rule of law and that operates only in 
a legislative role. The danger of a tyranny of the majority is just as real, in my view, as 
the danger of a tyranny of the elite. 
 
 
SB: - “ You mention Amartya Sen’s work on capabilities in Chapter Five. Have you had any 
further thoughts on the links between your account of freedom as non-domination and 
his account of freedom as development?” 
 
PP: - “Sen emphasizes the importance, not just of people functioning well, but of their 
having the capacity to function well. I think that this capacity to function well should 
have a rich social dimension. It should mean, not just that I can act as I will without 
others interfering, but also that my ability to act as I will in that manner is not 
contingent on others being favorably disposed towards me. It is not contingent, for 
example, on the continuing benevolence of some potentate in my society. In arguing 
for this line, I connect Sen’s work with the republican tradition. For one of the 
mainstays of that tradition is the claim that just to be under the power of another — 
just to have someone in the position of a master or ‘dominus’ — means that one is not 
really free; one acts only by the leave or permission,  ultimately by the grace and 
favor, of that other. In taking this line, I go beyond anything that Sen explicitly argues 
but I think that I remain true to the spirit of his work, in particular his emphasis on the 
enabling people to function rather than forcing them, as Rousseau might have put it, to 
achieve an appropriate level of functioning.” 
 
 
SB: - “ You’ve written in the past on the close links between Utilitarian moral theory and 
Virtue Ethics. Is your political theory predominantly utilitarian, and if so, do you think 
it would be very different if it were based on virtue theory?” 
 
PP: - “As Sen himself emphasizes, utilitarianism has at least two distinguishable 
components. It offers a way of ranking states of the world in telling us that utility, 
however interpreted, is all that matters. And it offers us a way of ranking alternatives 
by telling us that in any choice — any choice of action or plan or design — the right 
choice to make is that which maximizes expected utility (in the appropriate sense of 
utility). This first component is welfarist, the second consequentialist.  
 
I am a consequentialist, so far as I believe that the right choice, say the right choice 
between institutional designs, is that which maximizes expected value. But I am not a 
welfarist in Sen’s sense. In politics — in determining the right institutional designs 
and governmental policies — value should be measured, at least in the first instance, 
by freedom as nondomination. The best constitution for a polity, taking constitution in 
a broad sense, is that which maximizes the expected enjoyment of nondomination 
overall. (You may or may not wish to be more specific and say: expected equal 
enjoyment of nondomiantion. I happen to think that that is unnecessary since I have 
argued that with freedom as nondomination, the best way to increase it from any 
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unequal distribution is always to increase it for the worst off, thereby reducing 
inequality.) 
 
How does this position connect with virtue theory? It doesn’t connect with virtue 
theory in the sense in which that is a rival to consequentialism: in the sense in which it 
says that the right option in any choice is that which the virtous agent would make 
rather than that which maximizes expected value. I happen to believe that virtue 
theory in that sense is barely coherent. But the republican approach does connect with 
virtue theory in another sense. It argues that for the promotion of freedom as 
nondomination it is important, not just that the polity have appropriate institutions of 
government, but also that the citizenry display civic virtue: that they are ready to keep 
an eye on government, and to force it to stay on suitable tracks. The price of liberty is 
eternal vigilance. And the only assurance of eternal vigilance is reliable civic virtue: 
the sort of virtue that is most evident nowadays in the various social movement and 
nongovernmental organizations that characterize the best democratic  societies.” 
 
 
SB: - “ In the introduction, you state that political philosophers enable the renewal of the 
terms used in political debates. This would seem to be a fair characterization of the 
work of people like Sen, Nussbaum and other political theorists and economists 
involved in the Capability Approach network 
(http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~freedoms/) which has directly influenced the terms used 
in the UN development report. Is this one of the ways you had in mind in which 
political theorists can be influential? If not, then what is?” 
 
PP: - “This is a very good example of what I had in mind. And for this reason I am happy 
myself to be affiliated to the network; I have learned a great deal from Sen and 
Nussbaum. They have made a deep impact in a world where the dominant concepts 
for some time have been those of neoclassical economics. They have introduced into 
public debate the concept of functioning and of having a basic capacity to function in 
one’s own society. And those concepts have had an enormous impact, because they 
are theoretically well-worked out; because they have readily derivable implications for 
policy-making; and because, while they hold out the prospect of a greatly improved 
world, they do not direct us to any sort of fanciful utopia. I would like to think, as 
suggested above, that my own attempt to argue for replacing the concept of freedom 
as noninterference by the notion of freedom as nondomination tends in the same 
direction, and indeed that it is quite readily connected with the capability approach.” 
 
 
SB: - “ It seems as though the concept of freedom as non-domination has strong economic 
implications. You quote Machiavelli (p.32) as saying that non-domination tends to go 
hand in hand with economic prosperity. Later in Chapter Five, (p.163-165) you argue 
that conversely, a certain kind of economic prosperity i.e. good levels of employment 
and stability of the financial system is a precondition of non-domination. What kind of 
implications if any, do you think this has for theories of sustainable development, and 
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the kind of international policies that should be encouraged regarding developing 
countries?” 
 
PP: - “The implications are relatively straightforward, I think. First, the promotion of 
freedom as nondomination in a country requires universal access to a basic level of 
welfare and security, as well as universal access to education and information, 
political knowhow and legal justice: the items that figure in any account of what the 
capacity to function requires. Without these fundamentals in place, there will be many 
people who will be vulnerable to others and not assured of freedom as nondomination.  
 
Second, the promotion of freedom as nondomination requires the reduction, ideally 
the elimination, of discrimination on the grounds of gender, ethnicity, caste and the 
like. To the extent that one belongs to such a vulnerability class, as I have called it, 
one is in a position of always having to hang on the goodwill of the more powerful. 
That is directly opposed to the ideal of freedom as nondomination.  
 
Third, the promotion of freedom as nondomination in a developing country requires 
that the people of that country, and in particular the government, is not forced to 
depend on the grace and favor of donor countries; if they have to depend in this way, 
then they will be collectively — and ultimately, individually — subjected to a power 
that may, arbitrarily, turn against them. The lesson here is twofold. Aid should always 
be directed to enabling developing countries to become independent or, in effect, 
interdependent in the manner of developed countries; they should not become client 
states of any advanced countries. And aid should always be provided on the basis of a 
framework that is established firmly for a fixed period — say, under the aegis of the 
United Nations or the World Bank — and that does not continue to be available just at 
the whim of the donor state.” 
 
 
SB: - “ What would a Republican government’s international policies be and why? Does 
being a ‘good international citizen’ (p.152) have implication beyond peace keeping? 
For example, does a Republican country have a duty not to dominate other countries 
whether or not these countries may in turn dominate it? In particular, should the 
Republican state abstain from economic domination of other states?” 
 
PP: - “There are a number of fairly clear lessons for the international domain, in particular 
for an international domain in which military power and economic influence is so 
unevenly developed. The ideal in such a world is that while countries will naturally be 
interdependent in relation to one another, no country should have to depend on any 
other country or league of countries in a way that exposes it to state-level domination, 
making it inevitable that the dependent country will have to tailor its policies so as to 
keep the more powerful country sweet. And equally, of course, no country should 
have to depend in the same way on any single corporation or group of corporations or 
the same result will follow. 
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How to achieve the independence (or symmetrical interdependence) that I describe as 
an ideal? Two things seeem to me to be necessary. One is the development of trading 
and other blocs among the weaker countries: blocs that can give them power against 
strong states and corporations in the way that unionization gave nineteenth century 
workers a certain power against employers. And a second is the introduction of 
international bodies and networks that can regulate, under more or less widely agreed 
terms of reference, the relationships between states. Bodies like the United Nations, 
the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO and the like are of the first importance here. As 
government can serve domestically to regulate private relationships in a polity, so 
these bodies can provide a sort of regulation and regularization that guards against 
possibilities of abuse by strong governments or corporations.  
 
But at this point a question will arise that republicans have traditionally raised in the 
domestic sphere. Quis custodiet ipsos custodies? Who will protect us from our 
protectors? If we are to have international bodies that carry significant powers, then 
those bodies themselves must be held accountable if they are not to be arbitrary and 
dominating. This is an area of great contention — witness the debates in the EC — but 
my own belief is that accountability can be ensured under standard procedures 
associated with rule of law constraints and measures of review. In particular, it can be 
successfully achieved in that way so far as governments and nongovernmental 
organizations combine to exercise vigilance about all their doings.  
 
One last thought. With countries and corporations and international bodies, perhaps 
the most powerful influence by which they can be regulated is the fear of being 
shamed at exposure of some abuses. This influence is not well enough explored, I 
believe, in contemporary schools of institutional design. If I may be narcissistic, I 
would recommend attention to the themes examined in my 2004 book, co-authored 
with an economist, Geoffrey Brennan, entitled The Economy of Esteem (OUP).”  
 
 
SB: - “ You explain that the concept of freedom as non-domination can be used to articulate 
environmentalist views, even when these are radically eco-centric. Our dependence on 
the environment is such that inflicting environmental damage is a way of exercising 
domination on those who depend on that environment, even if they are not actually 
harmed by that damage. (This in the same way that a master dominates a slave even if 
he does not interfere with his day to day movement – the possibility of interference is 
enough of a threat). Could you say a little more on what the Republican position 
would be on environmentalism?” 
 
PP: - “If the republican concern for promoting freedom as nondomination extends to future 
as well as to present generations — as surely it must do — then environmental 
protection and preservation is vital for providing the infrastructure for the enjoyment 
of such freedom into the future. Let the quality of water decline world-wide; let ocean 
levels rise so as to inundate low-lying countries; let fish stocks become polluted or 
radically reduced; let any of these familiar catastrophes materialize, and the capacity 
of at least large sections of the world’s population to enjoy freedom as nondomination 
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will be severely jeopardized. Populations may be reduced internally to states of 
anarchy, lawlessness and mafia-like domination. They may be put in a relationship of 
utter dependency in relation to other peoples and states. Or at the least they may find 
themselves so impoverished that, even if domination does not increase as such, their 
opportunities for enjoying freedom as nondomination will have been greatly 
diminished; the freedom may still be formally there but its value or worth will have 




















Philip Pettit is William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics at Princeton since 
2002.  
 
The following was taken from his wep page : http://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/ 
 
“Philip Pettit works in two broad areas: the foundations of economics and the social 
sciences, where this includes issues of psychology and metaphysics as well as 
methodology; and moral and political theory: the theory of what values our social 
institutions should realise and of how they can be best organised to promote such 
values. In both areas he works sometimes in more purely philosophical mode, 
sometimes in a mode that engages with economic and related methods; and in both 
areas, he works sometimes on his own, sometimes in collaboration with colleagues in 
philosophy, economics, political science and law.” 
 
Le livre de Philip Pettit Republicanism a été traduit en Français chez Gallimard en 
2003. 
Pour une bibliographie complète, voire le curriculum vitae de Prof. Pettit sur 
http://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/CVPettit.pdf 
 
